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Assessing Allegations: Judicial Evaluation of Testimonial
Evidence in International Tribunals
Juliana Murray*
I. INTRODUCTION
Current scholarship focuses on the prohibition of torture' and the
inadmissibility of confessions or statements obtained through torture.2 The
scholarship correctly concludes that involuntary confessions or statements
should not be admissible in criminal proceedings. However, little attention has
been given to the procedural law governing the standards that judges sitting on
international tribunals do or should apply to determine whether a statement or
confession was obtained improperly. For example, if a defendant claims that
officials obtained his statement through coercive or improper means, what
procedures do international tribunals require before deciding whether the
statement is admissible into evidence? International and human rights treaties
uniformly prohibit the admission of evidence obtained through a violation of
human rights. These treaties are ambiguous, however, regarding the standards
judges should use to evaluate the credibility of an allegation of impropriety in
acquiring a statement or confession. In light of these ambiguities, it is
informative and necessary to examine national practices of judicial evaluation of
challenged testimonial evidence.
* BA 2005, Dartmouth College; JD Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law School.
Consider Jessica Powley Hayden, The Ties that Bind. The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and
Government Action Overseas, 96 Georgetown L J 237 (2007); Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists
Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59 Stan L Rev 1395 (2007); Jenny-Brooke Condon,
Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border between Torture and US Criminal Trials, 60 Rutgers L Rev
647 (2008).
2 See Tobias Thienel, The Admissibilioy of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law, 17 Eur J
Intl L 349 (2006).
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At least in theory, all countries agree that "involuntary confessions must be
excluded. Beyond that... the rationales and the rigor of exclusionary practices
vary greatly."3 Some countries establish mandatory rules that govern judicial
assessment of the admissibility of statements. The common law in England
requires that a statement or confession be voluntarily given in order to be
admissible in court; the common law's insistence on the exclusion of
involuntarily confessions is based in part on the refusal to accept oppression or
inducement. In the US, a party challenging the legality of a statement or
confession may file a motion to suppress; the judge will then hold an evidentiary
hearing to assess witness credibility and to determine whether the statement was
given knowingly and voluntarily, as is legally required.5 When a defendant alleges
that his confession was coerced, however, an automatic rule of exclusion applies
and the statement does not come into the trial as evidence.6
Other countries apply more discretionary standards. France applies a
relaxed and much less stringent standard that results in the admissibility of most
statements if the judge finds that the statement did not substantially violate the
rules of criminal procedure.7 The German Code of Criminal Procedure tracks
the general trend toward a more discretionary standard, although it does require
the mandatory exclusion of statements elicited by certain forbidden means.8
Although these and other states vary in their evaluative standards of such
statements, the practice of excluding involuntary or coerced statements qualifies
as customary international law. There is broad and established state practice of
this specific behavior of excluding certain types of statements. While some states
may exclude these statements out of a moral obligation-the desire not to
reward coercion or inhuman interrogation practices, for example-such
exclusion has also developed into opinio juris. That is, even if a state feels no
moral compulsion to exclude involuntary testimonial evidence, it will still do so
out of a sense of legal obligation.9
3 Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 Case W Res L Rev 375, 376 (2001).
4 A and others v Secretay ofStatefor the Home Department (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71.
5 See Miranda vArizona, 384 US 436, 522 (1996).
6 See, for example, Brain v US, 168 US 532, 543 (1897) (describing the voluntariness requirement
for confessions under the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which states that "[a]
confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any
threat or promise").
7 Bradley, 52 Case W Res L Rev at 388 (cited in note 3) ("While French authorities are expected to
avoid the use of unfair, brutal or deceptive methods ... French courts have traditionally been lax
in controlling the use of psychological pressure.") (citations omitted).
8 Id at 389.
9 The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 708 (1900) (stating that evidence of state practice of the specific
situation at issue satisfies the doctrine of establishing international custom).
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In addition to constituting customary international law, the prohibition
against admitting involuntary statements is also rooted in international treaties.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice offers a quasi-
hierarchy of the sources of international law; while it does not elevate treaties
explicitly, it does give them priority in its list of sources.'0 Treaties are also
widely recognized by scholars as a valid source of international law that may in
some circumstances be superior to custom, when treaties can more clearly reflect
the parties' specific intentions." In this instance, treaties establish the
international law that governs the procedural rules of the various international
tribunals. Specifically, the treaties establish procedural rules for both the
admissibility of statements and the prohibition against admitting statements
obtained in a manner that violates norms of permissible international behavior.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was the first UN
instrument to explicitly prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.' 2 It
followed on the heels of the establishment of the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) at Nuremberg, the first international criminal tribunal, which opened in
1945 for the "just and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals of
the European Axis."' 3 Because the IMT arose out of necessity following the
Second World War, the IMT Charter did not contain rules of evidence. '4 Since
then, judges in international tribunals, "in their legislative rule-making role, as
well as in the exercise of their judicial discretion... [have] relied on international
and regional norms ... embodied in international treaties" such as the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights.'
5
These international norms have also informed the laws of many countries,
resulting in general principles of law regarding due process in domestic courts
that reflect the due process of international courts and which inform the analysis
of international law. While the rules of the international tribunals attempt to
10 Statute of the International Court of Justice Art 38(1), 59 Stat 1055, 1060 (1945).
11 Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 Rec des Cours 25, 101 (1970-1) (stating that treaties "will
increasingly gain paramountcy over customary international law" because they can both
strengthen established customary international law and simplify its application); Elihu
Lauterpacht, ed, International Law: Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht I 86-7 (1970) (noting that
treaties are given priority as a source of international law and that States' rights and duties are
determined, "in the first instance, by their agreement as expressed in treaties.").
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Res No 217A (111), UN Doc A/810
71 (1948).
13 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Aug 8, 1945), Arts 1, 6, 59 Stat 1544,
1547, 82 UN Treaty Set 279, 288 (1945).
14 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, foreword, in Richard May and Marieke Wierda, International Criminal
Evidence xiv (Transnational 2002).
15 Id at xv.
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harmonize national and international practices, the language of the courts'
respective treaties exposes ambiguities and describes potentially conflicting
procedural and evidentiary rules.
This Comment analyzes the legal standards international tribunals apply
when assessing the credibility of defendants' claims that testimonial evidence
against them was improperly obtained. Section II focuses on existing rules of
evidence and procedure in international and regional tribunals, examining the
standards for admissibility of evidence in the tribunals' treaties and, where
available, in their jurisprudence. Section III examines the national practices of
several common and civil law countries that have established and tested rules
that can help to inform international courts' procedures. This examination of
national practices is not intended to be exhaustive and only reflects the domestic
law of select nations, but it nonetheless helps to inform the analysis. Section IV
weighs the benefits and pitfalls of establishing a standard for the judicial
assessment of challenged testimonial evidence in the international courts.
Section V concludes that requiring judges in international tribunals to first assess
the credibility of allegations of improper conduct, and then to exclude the
statements only if he finds the allegations to be true, will ensure that voluntary
and validly obtained statements are admitted into international criminal trials.
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS
International law prohibits human rights violations as a means to obtain
evidence against a defendant or to secure a statement or confession from a
defendant. This prohibition exists in both customary international law and in
treaties, several of which are especially pertinent to the impact of alleged human
rights violations on the admissibility of evidence at trial. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ad hoc Tribunals in particular offer the most
case law on these procedural issues in human rights cases. These treaties and the
courts' jurisprudence provide some insight into the underlying practices of the
international courts and their relationship to the procedural rules of domestic
courts, but they fail to present coherent and precise guidance to judges in
evaluating the admissibility of testimonial evidence.
A. International Legal Standards of Admissibility
Individual treaties govern each international tribunal, and these
international courts operate according to their respective treaties and procedural
rules. Examination of these texts exposes the varying standards for admissibility
of evidence in international courts. Specifically relevant here, the legal
documents establish different standards that judges should follow when
assessing contested evidentiary statements or confessions to determine whether
1/o. 10 No. 2
those statements should be admitted. The following summarizes the varying
standards in these treaties.
1. UN Convention against Torture
The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) is the UN instrument directly
prohibiting any act that inflicts severe pain and suffering-whether physical or
mental-for the purpose of punishment, coercion or intimidation, or obtaining
information or a confession.16 While it forbids torture under any circumstances
and with no exceptions, the UNCAT does not necessarily demand the exclusion
of testimonial evidence that a defendant alleges was improperly obtained.
Rather, it places the burden of preventing torture and excluding any tortured
statements on each individual state party. Article 15 of the UNCAT codifies this
specific exclusionary rule, which deems inadmissible any evidence "which is
established to have been made as a result of torture."'" The treaty specifies
neither who should establish whether the evidence in question was elicited
through torture, nor how one should make that determination. Signatory states
are obligated to report every four years to the Committee Against Torture
(CAT), a body established to supervise claims of torture.'8 While the UNCAT
empowers the CAT to investigate claims of torture, "[t]he Committee is a non-
judicial institution and, therefore, is not authorized to make decisions on
individual complaints" of torture. 19 The treaty thus establishes an ambiguous
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by torture and requires that each state
party ensure that tortured evidence does not reach trial, but it fails to establish a
supervisory arm with the authority to enforce these obligations.2"
The language of the UNCAT also fails to clearly allocate the burden of
proof in a case involving an allegation of tortured testimonial evidence.2' The
House of Lords faced this problem in A and others, a case in which the Court of
Appeals placed the burden of proving improper behavior on the person against
whom the evidence in question was used.22 The House of Lords unanimously
16 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("UNCAT"), Art 1, 1465 UN Treaty Ser 85 (1984).
17 UNCAT at Art 15 (cited in note 16).
18 Id at Arts 17-24.
'9 See Joachim Herrmann, Implementing the Prohibition of Torture on Three Levels: The United Nations, the
Council of Europe, and Germany, 31 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 437, 442 (2008).
20 UNCAT, Art 16 (cited in note 16).
21 See Thienel, 17 Eur J Intl L at 354 (cited in note 2) ("Mt seems doubtful whether any provision
on the burden of proof could properly be derived from Article 15 UNCAT").
22 A and others, 2 AC at 56.
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reversed the lower court's decision, noting that it would be unfair to place the
burden of proof on this private party, who has little ability to investigate and to
collect the necessary evidentiary support. The court therefore held that the duty
of investigation shifts to the court if the person alleging torture requests that the
court review the manner in which the statement was obtained. Once the
appellant has met his burden of stating a plausible reason for review, often by
showing the evidence has come from a country "widely known or believed to
practise torture," the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) will form
a fair judgment based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.23 "If
SIAC is unable to conclude that there is not a real risk that the evidence has
been obtained by torture, it should refuse to admit the evidence. Otherwise it
should admit it."
24
The House of Lords' approach in A and others clearly shifts the burden of
proof where a moving party has little ability to meet that burden, and it clearly
describes the inquiry the SIAC should undertake in determining-for the
purposes of UNCAT Article 15-whether statements were made as a result of
torture. This approach does not derive from the language of the UNCAT,
however, but rather from that particular bench's own interpretation and
discretion. Other panels or courts interpreting the UNCAT may choose
different standards of assessment, or may allocate the burden of proof to a
different party, thus resulting in an inconsistent application of the treaty. The
ambiguous language of the exclusionary rule opens the door for varying
standards that may lead to indiscriminate exclusion or admission of testimonial
evidence.
2. Rome Statute
The Rome Statute governs the jurisdiction and functioning of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Along with the Rome Statute, the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence 26 and the Elements of Crime 27 comprise the ICC's
basic legal texts. Rule 63(2) in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence states: "A
23 Id at 56 (per Lord Bingham).
24 Id.
25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"), 2187 UN Treaty Ser 3
(1998).
26 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court ("Rules of Procedure and
Evidence'), online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FlEOAC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-
B3E8Bll5E886/140164/Rules-ofprocedure andEvidence English.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
27 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court ("Elements of Crimes"), online at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-ABOB-68E5F9082543/0/
Element-ofCrimesEnglish.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Chamber shall have the authority, in accordance with the discretion described in
article 64, paragraph 9, to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to
determine its relevance or admissibility in accordance with article 69."28 While
this procedural rule authorizes the ICC Chamber to assess evidence, it does not
establish guidelines or standards by which the judges should do so. The
provisions of Article 69 of the Rome Statute likewise authorize the court to
exercise broad discretion in deciding on the admissibility of evidence.
Article 69(7) does not provide for an absolute exclusionary rule, but instead
prohibits the admission of evidence "obtained by means of a violation of this
Statute or internationally recognized human rights ... if: (a) The violation casts
substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the
evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings."29 The treaty's language presumably leaves the task of deciding
what constitutes "substantial doubt" to the ICC Chamber handling the specific
case. In making such a determination, the Chamber is constrained by the text of
in Article 69(8), which states: "When deciding on the relevance or admissibility
of evidence collected by a State, the Court shall not rule on the application of
the State's national law.",
30
The Rome Statute and the supplementary rules of the ICC provide for
judicial discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. First, the court must
determine whether the collection of the statements constitutes a violation of
either the Rome Statute or recognized human rights. Then, even if the court
does find that a violation occurred, it still has the authority to admit the
statements under the ambiguous language of Article 69(7). Some scholars
criticize this discretionary standard of review, arguing that authorizing judges to
admit illegally obtained evidence threatens uniformity and subverts the principles
of human rights upon which the ICC was founded. 31 Difficulties generally arise
in cases involving allegations of international human rights violations that do not
reach the level of torture.32 In these cases, critics argue, the judges' discretion
regarding the admissibility of evidence creates an assessment standard that
incorporates the judges' subjective perceptions. By permitting the members of
the ICC Chamber to make admissibility determinations in this manner, the
Rome Statute relies on the judges' own evaluative abilities.
28 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 63(2) (cited in note 26).
29 Rome Statute, Art 69(7) (cited in note 25).
30 Id at Art 69(8) (cited in note 25).
31 See Kweku Vanderpuye, The International Criminal Court and Discreionagy Evidential Exclusion: Toeing
the Mark?, 14 TulJ Intl & Comp L 127, 172-73 (2005).
32 Karin N. Calvo-Goller, The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court: ICTY and ICFR
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3. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) established the ECtHR, which hears cases
brought by a state party or by an individual who believes that a state party has
violated his rights under the ECHR.33 The ECHR is unique because it gives
individuals an active role in the international arena, where traditionally only
states are considered actors. Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture, stating
simply: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment., 34 Under Article 46, the Committee of Ministers
"retains the primary responsibility for supervising the execution of European
Court judgments."3 The Committee has no quasi-judicial function, however,
and its authority "is limited to the mere supervision and execution of
judgments." 36 The ECHR offers no further language on the admissibility of
statements or the standards by which to assess the statements' reliability.
4. Statutes and rules of procedure and evidence of the ad hoc
Tribunals.
The UN established the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), or the ad hoc Tribunals, to prosecute crimes
committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Although
both tribunals aim to complete all appeals by 2010, an examination of the courts'
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Tribunals' Rules) can apply more broadly to
other current and future ad hoc Tribunals. "The ad hoc Tribunals represent the
first time that jurists from different legal, political and cultural systems have
come together to participate in the adjudication of criminal cases."37 The
Tribunals' Rules provide for broad judicial discretion in evidentiary matters, and
the judges are not bound by national rules of evidence in determining
33 As of October 28, 2009, there are 47 states parties to the ECHR; see Member States of the Council of
Europe, online at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?
MA=3&CM=16&CL=ENG (visited October 28, 2009).
34 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR"), Art 3, 213 UN Treaty Ser 221 (1950).
35 Id at Art 46, 2 ("The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers, which shall supervise its execution."); see Philip Leach, The Effectiveness of the Committee of
Ministers in Supervising Enforcement of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 2006 Public L
443, 444 ("[it is the Committee of Ministers which retains the primary responsibility for
supervising the execution of European Court Judgments.").
36 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of InternationalJudidal Bodies: The Pieces of the Pu!zle, 31 NYU J
Ind L & Pol 709, 730 (1999); see Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 33
ILM 943.
37 Vladimir Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human
Rights: Rules and Procedure, 397 (Martinus Nijhoff 2008).
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admissibility.38 Under Rule 89 of the ICTY and ICTR, the Chamber may admit
"any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."3 9 It has the
discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the need to ensure a fair trial.40
The Tribunals' Rules favor a flexible approach to the issue of admissibility
of evidence in order to achieve the goal of fair and expeditious trials. When
addressing the admissibility of evidence, "questions of credibility or authenticity
[are] determined according to the weight given to each of the materials by the
judges at the appropriate time.",4' Rule 95, which inspired the language of Article
69(7) of the Rome Statute, provides that "[n]o evidence shall be admissible if
obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings., 42 In imposing few limits on the admissibility of evidence-largely
a result of the specific function of the ad hoc Tribunals to prosecute war
criminals-the Tribunals' Rules permit judges to exercise broad discretion in
admitting challenged testimonial evidence into trial.
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force
in 1976, reproduces the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that prohibits torture and other cruel or degrading treatment.43 Article 14 of the
ICCPR describes the rights to which every criminal defendant is entitled,
including the right against self-incrimination. 4' The ICCPR does not enforce or
supervise human rights, but instead leaves it to each signatory state to protect its
citizens' human rights. The Human Rights Committee is an independent body
that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR. States parties are obligated to
submit reports to the Committee describing how rights are being implemented.
38 ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("ICTR Rules') 89(A); ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence ("ICTY Rules') 89(A).
39 ICTR Rule 89(C); ICTY Rule 89(C).
40 ICTR Rule 95; ICTY Rule 89(D).
41 Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence at 403 (cited in note 37) (citing Prosecutor v Blalkd, Judgment, Case No
ICTY-95-14-T, T Ch I, 3 March 2000, 34).
42 ICTR Rule 95; ICTY Rule 95.
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR') (1966), Art 7, UN Doc A/6316
(entered into force Mar 23, 1976).
44 Id at Art 14(3)(g).
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The Committee then examines these reports and makes recommendations in the
form of "concluding obligations" to the states parties.45
B. International Case Law Involving Statements
Some of the cases that reach international tribunals raise questions
regarding the courts' procedural and evidentiary rules. When a defendant alleges
that testimonial evidence was collected in a manner constituting a violation of
his human rights, the rules of evidence will determine whether that evidence
should be automatically excluded from or admitted to trial, or whether the
judges should instead evaluate the manner in which the evidence was obtained
to determine its admissibility. The determination depends to some extent on the
role and purpose of the specific tribunal. For example, does the court elevate the
relevance and objective truth of testimonial evidence above the manner in which
the evidence is obtained? Should there be judicial discretion or a rigid regime of
admissibility?
The treaties and customary international law controlling these international
tribunals do not condone violations of human rights and will not reward such
violations. However, some tribunals grant broader judicial discretion to the
admissibility of evidence and allow judges to assess the credibility of claims of
impropriety before deciding whether the evidence should be admitted or
excluded from trial. The ICC Chamber, for example, has the discretion under
the permissive Rome Statute to admit evidence obtained through a violation of
human rights if the violation does not affect the reliability of the evidence or
damage the integrity of the proceedings.46 The case law of these international
and regional tribunals, especially the ECtHR and the ad hoc Tribunals, illustrates
the varying standards.
1. International Court of Justice
The ICJ settles legal disputes submitted to it by states parties, and the
specific question of the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the
admissibility of testimonial evidence has not yet reached the court. One recent
case may be instructive by analogy, however. In Avena and other Mexican Nationals,
the ICJ handled Mexico's suit against the US for violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).47 In its counter-memorial, the US
stressed the importance of admitting the voluntary statements that the
defendants made to officials:
45 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, About the Human Rights Committee,
online at http://www2.ohchr.org/engfish/bodies/hrc/ (visited October 29, 2009).
46 See Rome Statute, part I.A.69 (cited in note 25).
47 Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v US), 2004 ICJ 11 (Mar 31, 2004).
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Frequently, the most reliable and probative evidence at a criminal trial will
be the defendant's voluntary statement. To deny the prosecution the ability
to introduce a confession that is not coerced, that is supported by sufficient
detail to permit confidence in its truthfulness, that is taken in a manner that
guarantees its voluntariness, and that meets other United States
constitutional standards, would deprive the fact-finder of important
evidence of guilt ... An exclusionary rule also exacts a uniquely high price
in the United States justice system because, unlike in most States, the
government cannot appeal an acquittal, even if based on a legal mistake by
the fact finder.48
Nonetheless, the ICJ found that the US violated its obligations to notify under
Article 36 of the VCCR and thus deemed that the statements defendants made
prior to the notification of their consular rights were inadmissible at the trial
proceedings. The ICJ considered the US position in favor of admitting the
statements because they were not obtained involuntarily or in violation of
recognized human rights, but the VCCR ultimately determined the court's
judgment in Avena. It is unclear how the court would have ruled if admissibility
of the statements were the sole issue in the case.
2. International Criminal Court
The ICC is an independent permanent tribunal established to prosecute
individuals for the most serious crimes of international concern-genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes.49 Because the ICC hears only serious
crimes against humanity, the case law is not comparable to that of any other
courts, international or domestic. Given the limited category of cases that appear
before the ICC, and their unique nature, there is no case law from the ICC
raising the issue of admissibility of allegedly coerced statements. If the issue
should arise, Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute codifies the exclusionary rule to
govern evidence and the ICC Chamber retains discretion over the admissibility
of challenged evidence. No relevant cases have reached the ICC at this time,
however.
3. European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR does not apply an absolute exclusionary rule to the
admissibility of testimonial evidence, even when the defendant alleges that the
48 Counter-Memorial of the US, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United
States) *269 n 398 (Nov 3, 2003), online at http://www.icj-cij.org/doeket/files/128/10837.pdf
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
49 See, International Criminal Court ("ICC"), About the Court, online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (describing the history and functioning of the ICC)
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
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statements at issue were obtained improperly. Because of "its policy of not
directly interfering with national law, [the ECtHR] has never held that
improperly obtained evidence must be excluded."' The Court explains its
rationale for the absence of an exclusionary rule in Miailhe v France, concluding
that it is appropriate to leave those evidentiary questions to national courts,
which are competent to determine the admissibility of evidence, instead of
making those decisions on its own authority.5" Although the ECtHR ultimately
defers to the decisions of national tribunals regarding the admissibility of
evidence, it does reserve the right to ensure that the proceedings as a whole are
fair. 2 Because the ECtHR may evaluate the methods used to obtain testimonial
evidence pursuant to the ECHR Article 6(1) right to a fair trial, it may apply a
discretionary exclusionary rule by holding that the admission of statements
coerced by torture or improper means would violate ECHR Article 6(1). In this
vein, the court has ruled on the sufficiency of the member states' efforts to
secure individuals' human rights and freedoms, confronting cases involving
allegations of torture or ill-treatment in obtaining evidence. It is useful to first
look at cases involving allegations of ill-treatment in order to better understand
ECHR Article 3, and then to turn to cases raising procedural questions regarding
the admissibility of evidence that is alleged to have been coerced by such ill-
treatment.
a) Allegations of ill-treatment.
In Assenov v Bulgaria, the Court held that ECHR Article 3 requires that
national authorities conduct an investigation into allegations of ill-treatment if
the defendant's allegations "raise a reasonable suspicion" that he has been
seriously ill-treated. 3 The court noted that ECHR Article 3 states that the
alleged "ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within
the scope of Article 3. The assessment of that minimum is relative: it depends
on all the circumstances of the case." 54 The court proceeded to assess the
medical evidence offered and, in its discretion, found that the injuries were
sufficiently serious to qualify as ill-treatment under the ECHR. 5 However, it
50 Herrmann, 31 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev at 447 (emphasis added) (cited in note 19).
51 Miailhe v France, App No 18978/91, 23 ECHR 491, 43 (1996).
52 Id.
53 Assenov v Bulgaria, App No 1998-VIII, ECHR 24760/94, 1 101 (1998) (involving allegations of
abuse by police where the applicant submitted his medical records as evidence).
54 Id at 94.
55 Id at 95.
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found that the evidence offered to support the allegation that the police caused the
injuries was insufficient.5 6
In Andreyevskiy v Russia, the Court noted that "allegations of ill-treatment
must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court [
] generally applie[s] the standard of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7 The
applicant in Andryevskiy alleged that the police beat him "with a view to
extracting a confession to the murder" and that he confessed only when the
police threatened to rape his mother and girlfriend.58 The day after this
mistreatment purportedly occurred, the applicant wrote a statement confessing
to the murder, and he noted that he made the confession without any moral or
physical pressure. Months later, he recanted that statement and submitted that
the confession was obtained from him by force. During the trial in Russia, the
district court found him guilty and "dismissed as unfounded the applicant's
allegations of ill-treatment" on the basis of his contradictory statements
regarding the circumstances. s9 In evaluating the applicant's appeal, the ECtHR
examined the allegation in the same manner the Court adopted in Assenov. The
court assessed the alleged ill-treatment and the sufficiency of the national
authorities' investigation into the allegation and held that the manner in which
the police obtained applicant's confession did not violate Article 3 ECHR.60 The
court therefore admitted the statement into evidence.6'
b) Procedural questions regarding the admissibitiy of evidence
The ECtHR has indicated that the use of evidence obtained as a result of
acts of violence or ill-treatment that reaches the minimum level of severity
required by ECHR Article 3 can constitute a violation of the ECHR Article 6(1)
right to a fair trial.62 Specifically, the court has stated that the use of evidence
"obtained as a result of torture" renders the proceedings unfair even if "the
56 Id at T 100-01 (finding a violation of ECHR Art 3 on the separate claim of inadequate
investigation, "in view of the lack of a thorough and effective investigation into the applicant's []
claim that he had been beaten by police officers.").
57 Andreyevskiy v Russia, App No 1750/03, ECHR 1750/03, 59 (2009).
58 Id at 7.
59 Id at 24.
60 Id at 54-57.
61 Id at 58.
62 Levinta v Moldova, App No 17332/03, ECHR 17332/03, 99 (2009) (finding violations of ECHR
Arts 3 and 6 where applicants were ill-treated for the purpose of extracting confessions and where
the authorities were aware of the ill-treatment, but did not act to stop it. The court states that the
use of evidence gathered in a manner that violates ECHR Art 3 "always raises serious issues as to
the fairness of the proceedings.")
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admission of the evidence was decisive in securing the applicant's conviction." 63
In Jalloh v Germany, the police action of administering an emetic in order to
provoke regurgitation of a bag of cocaine attained the minimum level of severity,
under the court's assessment of the circumstances. 64 Although Jalloh involved
physical and not testimonial evidence, the court's stated rationale for
determining admissibility is useful. The court cited a US case, Rochin v California,
as persuasive authority for its exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence that was
obtained by improper means, noting that "[c]oerced confessions offend the
community's sense of fair play and decency., 6' Thus while the court agreed that
admitting confessions coerced by torture would constitute an unfair proceeding in
violation of ECHR Article 6(1), it specifically left open the question of how to
handle allegations of acts amounting to less than torture,
6 6
4. Ad Hoc Tribunals
Similar rules govern the procedures of the ICTR and the ICTY. In these ad
hoc Tribunals, "[d]ecisions relating to the admissibility of evidence ... largely fall
within the discretion of the Trial Chamber."6 The Chamber has the discretion
to evaluate inconsistencies in, or concerns about, the evidence. It may also
consider whether a witness is reliable and whether the evidence offered is
credible.6 ' Like the ECtHR, the ad hoc Tribunals do not have an absolute
exclusionary rule that requires the exclusion of all unlawfully obtained evidence.
The "manner and surrounding circumstances in which evidence is obtained, as
well as its reliability and defect on the integrity of the proceedings, will determine
its admissibility. ' 69 The Chamber has the authority to exclude evidence pursuant
to Rule 95, although a commentator noted in 2003 that "[i]t does not seem that
the Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals have ever applied the provisions of Rule
95.,70
63 Id at 100; note that the court here indicates that the use of evidence obtained by torture
automatically violates Art 6, but that this holding still requires that the court first determine
whether there was in fact ill-treatment and, if so, its severity.
64 Jallob v Germany, App No 54810/00, ECHR 54810/00, 1 76 (2006).
65 Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 173 (1952) (finding a due process violation where police obtained
evidence of illegal drugs by pumping defendant's stomach against his will, the court analogizes
this extraction of physical evidence to the extraction of a verbal confession by physical abuse).
66 Jaiob, App No 54810/00 at 1107 ("In the present case, the general question whether the use of
evidence obtained by an act qualified an inhuman and degrading treatment automatically renders a
trial unfair can be left open") (cited in note 64).
67 Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence at 404 (cited in note 37).
68 ProsecutorvAleksovski, Case No ICTY-95-14/1-A, App Ch, T 63 (Mar 24, 2000).
69 Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence at 407 (cited in note 37).
70 Salvatore Zappalh, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings 151 (Oxford 2003).
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In its decision adopting evidentiary guidelines, the Chamber in Prosecutor v
Martil referred to the exclusionary rule outlined in Rule 95.71 Specifically, the
Chamber held: "If there are prima facie indicia that there was such oppressive
conduct [in obtaining the testimonial evidence at issue], the burden is on the
party seeking to have the evidence admitted to prove that the statement was
voluntary and not obtained by oppressive conduct."72 The defendant did not
challenge the manner in which any of his statements was obtained during trial
proceedings, however, so the prosecution did not have to produce evidence to
prove that the statements offered were properly obtained.
The ICTY Chamber hearing Prosecutor v Delali et al defined the exclusionary
rule embodied in Rule 95 as "a residual exclusionary provision., 73 The
defendant's motion challenged the admissibility of his confession, which he
alleged the police induced from him illegally. The Chamber evaluated evidence
of thc circumstances of his confession and determined that no such violation
had occurred and that the confession was therefore admissible. In assessing the
evidence, the Chamber applied the Austrian national rules of evidence. While
Rule 89(A) provides that the trial chamber "shall not be bound by national rules
of evidence," the Chamber noted that, "where the interest of justice demands
and the matter before [the court] can be better determined by the application of
the national rules of evidence, the Trial Chamber may apply such rules."74 Weeks
after the Chamber denied this motion, the defense argued for the exclusion of
another defendant's statements, alleging a violation of Rule 95, but it again failed
to persuade the Chamber. The Chamber ruled in favor of the prosecution and
admitted the statements over objection after evaluating the evidence presented
and, in its discretion, determining that the admission of the testimonial evidence
would not damage the integrity of the proceedings.7"
In its judgment in Prosecutor v Furund4ja, the ICTY observed:
In international human rights law, which deals with State responsibility
rather than individual criminal responsibility, torture is prohibited as a
criminal offence to be punished under national law; in addition, all States
parties to the relevant treaties have been granted, and are obliged to
exercise, jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and punish offenders. 76
71 Prosecutor v Marfi?, Decision Adopting Guidelines on the Standards Governing the Admission of
Evidence, Case No ICTY-95-1 1-T, T Ch I Jan 19, 2006).
72 Id at 9.
73 Prosecutor v Delalii et al, Decision on Zdravko Mucih's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, Case
No ICTY-96-21-T, T Ch II, 44 (Sept 2, 1997).
74 Id at 49.
75 Prosecutor v Dela&h et al, Decision on the Motions for the Exclusion of Evidence by the Accused,
Zejnil Delalk, Case No ICTY-96-21-T, T Ch II, 45 (Sept 25 1997).
76 Prosecutorv Furund!Z/a, Case No ICTY-95-17/I-T, 38 ILM 317, 145 (Dec 10, 1998).
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This firm condemnation of torture appeared in the Chamber's assessment of the
merits of the case and did not relate to testimonial evidence. However, one
might expect that the ad hoc Tribunals would likewise denounce torture and ill-
treatment procedurally and would exercise their exclusionary authority under
Rule 95 whenever allegations of such impropriety arise with respect to evidence.
Instead, the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals supports the conclusion that the
Rules impose no mandatory exclusion of evidence on the judges in their
determinations of admissibility.
III. NATIONAL PRACTICES
As discussed above, the ECtHR ultimately defers to the national courts'
decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, and the ad hoc Tribunals
sometimes choose to apply national rules of evidence. For example, the ad hoc
Tribunals necessarily adopted rules of procedure and evidence that derived from
common law and civil law experiences.77 These international criminal tribunals
are expected "to be informed and inspired by progressive national practices and
international research. In turn, the courts have the capacity to provide human
rights based models for domestic legal proceedings. 7 8 Study of national
practices is highly relevant in international legal scholarship:
Increasingly, comparative criminal law and procedure furnishes international
law through general principles of law, which are identified from national
laws with norms of the general part and the procedural part of domestic
criminal law, and which apply to the direct enforcement system. Thus, the
substantive and procedural norms, which are applicable to proceedings
before international legal institutions... derive from such general principles
of law. 79
Understanding several nations' approaches to the exclusion of statements can
help to inform an analysis of the procedure in international tribunals. This
discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to emphasize certain
differences in the approaches of various courts to the admissibility of challenged
testimonial evidence. Particularly, it notes the difference between the
discretionary standard of the ICC and the French, English and German courts,
and the rule of automatic exclusion applied in the US judicial system. All these
77 Bassiouni, foreword, in May and Wierda, International Criminal Evidence at xv (cited in note 14).
78 Rosemary Byrne, Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Aylum Proceedings: Guiding Standards from the
International Criminal Tribunals, 19 Ind J Refugee L 609, 611 (2007).
79 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduclion to International Criminal Law 5 (Transnational 2003).
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courts aim to discover the truth and simultaneously strive to protect individuals'
human rights, yet these interests are sometimes in tension.
A. United States
The constitutional right against self-incrimination limits the power of
custodial interrogation and protects against the admission of inculpatory
statements in criminal proceedings. At common law, defendants' statements
were admitted into evidence if the court found that the statements were reliable.
When the court deemed the statement to be reliable, it also presumed that the
statement was voluntary.8° Courts later moved from the reliability test to a test
of the voluntariness of the statement or confession in question.81 Then the US
Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision, holding in Miranda vArizona
that a defendant has certain constitutional rights of which he should be
informed before custodial interrogation can proceed and before any statements
made in those circumstances may be admitted into evidence.82 Miranda therefore
established an absolute exclusionary rule, or a default rule requiring the exclusion
of statements made under certain conditions, without the need to establish
whether they were voluntarily given. However, voluntariness still remains the
threshold requirement for testimonial evidence in most cases.
1. Voluntariness Requirement
In 1968, Congress enacted 18 USC 5 3501 to govern the admissibility of
confessions. The statute provides in part that "a confession . . . shall be
admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such evidence is received
in evidence, the trial judge shall ... determine any issue as to voluntariness.',8 3
This requirement protects the due process demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution and prevents violations of the Fifth
Amendment's right against self-incrimination.8 4 Judicial determination of the
voluntariness of a statement controls the statement's admissibility, regardless of
its veracity. Therefore, while an involuntary confession is inadmissible partially
because such a confession is likely to be unreliable, it is also inadmissible, even if
it is true, because of the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important
80 Boaz Sangero, Miranda is Not Enough: A New Jusification for Demanding "Strong Corroboration" to a
Confession, 28 Cardozo L Rev 2791, 2794 (2007).
81 Ziang Sung Wan v United States, 266 US 1, 14 (1924) ("A confession is voluntary in law if, and only
if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.").
82 Miranda, 384 US 436 (cited in note 5).
83 Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts, Pub L No 90-351, 82 State 210
(1968) codified at 18 USC § 3501 (a).
84 See Brain, 168 US at 542 (cited in note 6).
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human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of
securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.""5
The reasoning behind this principle is analogous to the human rights protections
codified in international law treaties.
If the defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession or statement
by alleging that it was coerced or obtained through improper means, US courts
will hold a suppression hearing so the judge may consider all the evidence
supporting or denying the validity of the confession.86 The judge then makes a
determination on the admissibility of the statement in question, based in part on
her credibility assessment of the parties.8" In determining voluntariness, the
judge is to take into consideration all circumstances regarding the manner in
which the confession was obtained.88 This procedure prevents the admission of
coerced or improperly obtained statements and safeguards the rights of criminal
suspects. The judge in US criminal proceedings therefore determines the
admissibility of challenged testimonial evidence on the basis of an evidentiary
suppression hearing if the defendant challenges the statement before trial. If the
defendant raises the challenge during trial, the court again makes the
determination, pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
govern the introduction of evidence in proceedings in US federal courts. Rule
104 states that questions of admissibility "shall be determined by the court,"
outside the hearing of the jury.89
2. Miranda Warnings and Judicial Determination of Admissibility
The rights established in Miranda require that suspects receive and
voluntarily waive certain rights before their statements or confessions will be
deemed admissible. Specifically, the warnings inform defendants of their right to
remain silent and to consult an attorney, and warn that any statements they make
can and will be used against them in court. If a suspect confesses without
85 Jackson v Denno, 378 US 384, 386 (1963).
86 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(3)(C) (permitting a defendant to make a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence); FRCP 26.2.
87 FRCP 26.2, Advisory Committee Note on 1983 Amendment (requiring the production of witness
statements at suppression hearings "enhances the ability of the court to assess the witnesses'
credibility and thus assists the court in making accurate factual determinations at suppression
hearings.")
88 18 USC § 3501(b).
89 Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a); note also that the jury system in the US does not affect this
analysis, because all questions of admissibility occur at the initial stages of litigation whether the
case proceeds to a jury or is decided by the judge herself. A judge's determination of admissibility
is highly relevant even in bench trials, because the judge is presumed and expected to make her
rulings based only on the legally admissible evidence and cannot take any excluded evidence into
consideration in deciding a case.
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receiving these Miranda warnings and without knowingly and voluntarily waiving
them, his unwarned statements will be automatically excluded from the criminal
proceeding.9" In cases involving questions of unwarned statements that
potentially occur in a custodial situation where Miranda warnings are required,
judicial assessment of credibility and demeanor is crucial, because the trial judge
often has to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired. 9' The US system
therefore entrusts the judge with the task of evaluating the credibility of a
defendant's claim that the statements violated the voluntariness requirement.
3. Exclusionary Rule
The US exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, punishing
the use of improper means to obtain incriminating statements by demanding the
exclusion of those statements at trial.9 2 The US Supreme Court's decision in
Mapp v Ohio held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
must be excluded from state and federal criminal trials. 93 Mapp signified a
departure from common law tradition and, although Chief Justice Burger
declared in 1971 that the exclusionary rule is "unique to American
jurisprudence,"94 other countries have adopted the exclusionary rule to some
degree.9" Critics of the rule argue that it allows the criminal to "go free because
the constable has blundered" and therefore leads to the over-exclusion of
relevant evidence. 96 The same criticism may be levied against the automatic
exclusionary rule that applies to allegedly coerced confessions. As with the
admissibility of other testimonial evidence, the judge should determine the
validity of the allegation before deciding whether to exclude the statement.
Otherwise the possibility of excluding valid and voluntary confessions on the
basis of a false allegation of impropriety will impede the truth finding function
of trial. Note that the exclusionary rule, especially as applied to physical
evidence, may be in danger in the US court systems. The Supreme Court has
limited the exclusionary rule in two recent cases, 17 and "critics of the
90 See Missouri v Seibert, 542 US 600, 601 (2004).
91 Thompson vKeohane, 516 US 99, 118 (1995).
92 United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 916 (1984).
93 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
94 Bivens v Six Unknown NamedAgents, 403 US 388, 415 (1917) (Burger dissenting).
95 See Craig M. Bradley, The EmeTging International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 Mich J
Intl L 171, 174-75 (1993).
96 People v Defore, 242 NY 13, 21 (1926).
97 See Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586, 599 (2006) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of the
"knock and announce" rule is admissible); Herring v United States, 129 SCt 695, 704 (2009) (holding
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exclusionary rule have high hopes that the Court will overrule Mapp."98 Yet for
the present, and especially with regard to statements that a defendant claims to
have been coerced, the exclusionary rule remains the law in US criminal trials.
B. England
At common law, English courts had virtually no exclusionary rule. Any
evidence that satisfied the relevancy requirement was admissible at trial,
"regardless of how it had been obtained." 9  Today the English courts apply a
more discretionary standard in determining the admissibility of evidence,
although judges have less discretion regarding statements and confessions that
were obtained by improper means.' 0
1. Common Law
At common law, English courts generally allowed the admission of any
relevant evidence, but the courts imposed a strict voluntariness requirement on
any statements or confessions offered into evidence. The King's Bench stated its
rationale for this voluntariness requirement, and the inadmissibility of
involuntary confessions, in Regina v Warickshall
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it
is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is
admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so
questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt,
that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected. 10 1
The common law held statements inadmissible if there was any indication that
the statement was induced and thus involuntary. For example, the courts held
that the following language constituted improper inducement that made the
subsequent statements inadmissible: "There is no doubt thou wilt be found
guilty: It will be better for you if you confess"'0 2 and "[i]t would be better for her
to speak the truth."'0 3 English common law took evidence of coercion in
collecting statements seriously and punished such improper behavior by
98 Adam Cohen, Is the Supreme Cour About to Kill Off the Exclusionay Rule?, NY Times (Feb 15, 2009),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O2/16/opinion/16mon4.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
99 Bradley, 52 Case W Res L Rev at 375 (cited in note 3).
100 Vanderpuye, 14 Tul J Intl & Comp L 127, 152 (2005) (cited in note 31) (citing the English case
Regina v Sang [1979] AC 402, 2 (HL) (UK), which held that, "[slave with regard to admissions
and confessions . .. [a trial judge] has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible
evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means.").
101 Regina v Waricksball, (1783) 168 Eng Rep 234, 235 (KB) (UK).
102 Sberrington's Case, (1838) 2 Lewin, Cr Cas 123, 123 (UK).
103 Regina v Garner, (1848) 1 Denison, Cr Cas 329, 331 (UK).
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automatically excluding the confessions from the trial proceedings. Such
exclusion was unique to testimonial evidence and marked a departure from the
lax relevancy requirements that the court applied to other evidence. Modern
English law presents similar rationales for its voluntariness requirement.
2. Police and Criminal Evidence Act and Interrogation Rules
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) took effect in January 1996
and gave English courts broader discretion to assess the admissibility of
evidence. Section 76 of PACE governs confessions, and allows for the
admission of statements made by the accused with some exceptions. In
particular, PACE § 76(2) provides: "If. .. it is represented to the court that the
confession was or may have been obtained ... by oppression of the person who
made it," the court shall exclude the confession from evidence unless the
prosecution proves to the court that the confession was obtained properly.0 4
Section 76(8) defines oppression to include "torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, and the use or threat of violence."'0 5 Under PACE 5 78(1), the court
is responsible for ensuring the fairness of criminal proceedings and may exercise
its discretion in excluding statements if it finds they were obtained in an
improper manner.'0 6 Often, it is the provision entitling the defendant to a fair
trial that leads the court to exercise its exclusionary discretion. In deciding what
constitutes a fair trial, or adequate due process, the courts have referred to
Article 6 of the ECHR.
10 7
England's interrogation rules, in the PACE Codes of Practice (PACE
Codes), are similar to the American requirement of Miranda warnings. These
rules affect the admissibility of statements taken while the suspect is in police
custody. They require that the police inform the suspects of their rights,
specifically the right to remain silent, the fact that any statements may be used
against the suspect as evidence, and the right to have legal advice from a
personal attorney or from the Duty Solicitor.0 8 PACE Code requires that the
104 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE") § 76(2) (UK ST 1984 c 60 Pt VIII s 76).
105 Id at § 76(8).
106 Id at § 78(1). Section 78(1) reads:
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it.
107 See Regina vA, [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 46 (UK) (citing the ECHR Article 6(1) right to a
fair trial in deciding whether to admit evidence of alleged rape victim's reputation).
108 PACE Code C: Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons by
the Police, 3.1, 6.
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suspect be warned of his rights not only orally but also in writing, and the
suspect must sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notices pursuant to
PACE Code 3.2. Additionally, the Code requires that the warnings be given as
soon as there are grounds to suspect the accused of an offense; in contrast, the
US Miranda warnings attach only when a suspect is subjected to custodial
interrogation. The English interrogation rules are therefore more stringent than
the US interrogation protections under Miranda.°9 Thus courts adhering to
PACE and its Codes of Practice have little discretion to inquire into the
voluntariness of statements and to admit challenged confessions or statements,
unless the prosecution overcomes the allegations of impropriety.
PACE shifts the burden to the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that officials did not impose inhumane treatment or torture on the
accused in obtaining his statements. The House of Lords addressed this
procedural rule in Regina v Mushtaq. "' In Mushtaq, the trial judge ruled pursuant
to PACE § 76(2) that the confession had not been obtained by oppression, but
unnecessarily instructed the jury to consider the possibility of coercion in
weighing the evidence. The House of Lords held that such instruction did not
violate the right to a fair trial guaranteed by ECHR Article 6(1). The court also
certified a point of general importance, holding that the admissibility of a
confession was a matter solely for the judge, as it is under the US Federal Rules
of Evidence. Therefore, if the defendant raises an objection to the admission of
a statement, claiming that it should be excluded because obtained by oppression,
the prosecution must disprove the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. The
judge will then decide the ultimate issue of admissibility.
The defendant in Regina v Fulling raised such a challenge to the admissibility
of her statement, which she alleged the police obtained through oppression in
violation of PACE § 76(2)(a)."' The judge stated: "I am satisfied that oppression
cannot be made out on the evidence I have heard in the context required by the
statutory provision.""' The judge proceeded to clarify that the decision rested
entirely on the validity of the prosecution's evidence: "[M~y ruling is based
exclusively upon the basis that, even if I wholly believed the defendant, I do not
regard oppression as having been made out. In those circumstances, her
confession-if that is the proper term for it-the interview in which she
confessed, I rule to be admissible.""' 3 Here, the judge exercised his discretionary
109 See Bradley, 14 Mich J Intl L at 185 (cited in note 95).
110 Regina v Mushtaq, [2005] UKHL 25, [2005] 1 WLR 1515 E (UK).
11 Regina v Fulling, [1987] QB 426 (UK).
112 Idat429.
113 Id at 430.
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powers in evaluating the validity of the prosecution's evidence offered against
the allegation of oppression.
The House of Lords offers a comprehensive summary of the history of the
English exclusionary rule in A and others,14 where ten individuals detained under
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 appealed the dismissal of
their earlier appeal. In allowing the appeals and remitting each individual case,
the House of Lords reiterated the common law rule that evidence obtained by
torture must be excluded from trial. The court stated that "the [Special
Immigration Appeals C]ommission should adopt the test of admissibility laid
down in Article 15 of the Torture Convention" and that, if the commission is
doubtful as to the veracity of the defendant's claims of torture, the commission
"should admit [the statement], bearing their doubt in mind in evaluating it.""...
The court therefore noted that the admission of statements claimed to have
been improperly obtained is not necessarily precluded by law; instead, the
prosecution must overcome the burden of proving that the evidence in question
was not coerced. The court also recognized judges' ability to take all
circumstances of the testimonial evidence into account, including the means by
which it was obtained, when making their credibility determinations.
C. France
Evidentiary requirements in the civil law France are more relaxed than
those in the US or England, largely because violations of French rules of
interrogation "are not generally backed up with an exclusionary sanction.""' 6 The
police are not required to inform a detainee of his right to remain silent,
although the defendant must be warned before judicial interrogation at trial."17
Even then, a defendant's choice to exercise his right to silence "can give rise to
an unfavourable inference against the accused.""' 8 Defendants have a right to
legal counsel, but the lawyer may not be present during interrogation and may
not consult with the defendant for more than thirty minutes. The Code de
Procedure Pnale states that "violations of the provisions of Articles 63 and 64,
governing investigatory detention, might lead to exclusion if it were shown that
114 A and others, 2 AC 71.
115 Idat 222.
116 Bradley, 14 Mich J Intl L at 205 (cited in note 95).
117 Eric Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 Brandeis L J 277, 316 (Winter 2003/2004).
118 Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton, and Michael Wilson, Stranded Between Partisanship and Truth?: A
Comparative Anaysis of Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 Melb U L
Rev 448, 455 (2005).
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'the search for the truth was fundamentally tainted,""' . 9 but confessions or
statements taken in violation of the interrogation rules are not necessarily
excluded from trial. 1
20
There are three levels of offense in France: delits flagrants, or felonies,
punishable by five years' or more imprisonment; dMits, or misdemeanors,
punishable by two months to five years' imprisonment; and contraventions,
punishable by no more than two months' imprisonment. 121 The felonies must be
investigated by an investigating judge, a completely independent party whose
role is to search for the material truth. 22 If the investigating judge finds adequate
evidence for a possible prosecution, he will refer the case to a court or
tribunal.'23 In the trial phrase, there are practically no rules of evidence-as long
as the evidence offered is open to challenge, it will be accepted. 124 Decisions
regarding the admissibility of evidence are left entirely to the discretion of the
judge, who determines both the admissibility and the weight of the evidence
presented. "This principle is often referred to as the 'free assessment of
evidence,' and is seen as a corollary of the search for material truth."'125
French courts are generally more lax in controlling the use of psychological
pressure during interrogations, and the police and courts alike are not as likely to
pay attention to civil liberties as the courts of other countries. 126 Cases of
mandatory exclusion are therefore rare, and judges generally exclude statements
only if they were taken in violation of a substantial provision of the Code and if
the court finds that the violation harmed the interested party. 127
119 Richard S. Frase, introduction, in The French Code of Criminal Procedure 16 n 105 (FB Rothman rev
ed 1988).
120 See Code de Procedure Nnale, Art 63 (2007).
121 See Bradley, 14 Mich J Intl L at 203 (cited in note 95); Nagorcka et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 456
(cited in note 118).
122 Nagorcka et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 456 (cited in note 118).
123 Consider Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the
French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal L Rev 542 (May 1990).
124 Id at 677-82.
125 Nagocka et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 461 (cited in note 118); John Hatchard, Barbara Huber and
Richard Vogler, eds, Comparative Criminal Procedure 29 (British Inst of Intl and Comp L 1996)
(noting that "courts are concerned more with the 'weight' or 'value' of evidence than its
admissibility.").
126 Bradley, 52 Case W Res L Rev at 388 (cited in note 3).
127 Id.
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D. Germany
The German Code of Criminal Procedure provides for rights analogous to
the US Miranda rights. 128 Prior to questioning in court, the police must inform
the accused of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel; failure to give
these warnings will result in the exclusion of any unwarned statement or
confession. While these warning rights attach even before the suspect is taken
into custody, the accused has no absolute right under German law to have his
attorney present during police questioning. 129 In the Decision of February 27,
1992, the Fifth Senate of the Federal Court of Appeals in Germany cited
Miranda in its opinion, declaring that a confession made during an interrogation
not proceeded by statutory warnings is not admissible in court. 3 °
Section 136a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure describes the
circumstances that render a statement inadmissible and lays down the "most
explicit German exclusionary rule."'' Section 136a of the Code, the German
counterpart to the US exclusionary rule and the English mandatory exclusion of
confessions in PACE 5 76(2), prohibits statements procured "by ill-treatment, by
fatigue, by physical interference, by dispensing machines, by torture, by
deception or by hypnosis."' 132 A mandatory, unconditional exclusionary rule
applies to any statements or confessions obtained involuntarily, regardless of
their probative value. The German rules are less stringent than the US
exclusionary rules, except in cases involving statements obtained by police
deception, which the German Code automatically excludes. 133
The German courts created a judicial remedy for illegally obtained evidence
that is similar to the common law courts' approach.'34 Similar to French
procedure, German procedure recognizes the principle of free evaluation of
evidence and elevates the probative value of the evidence above technical issues
of admissibility. 35 The judge determines the reliability of evidence and must be
convinced personally of the truth of the facts, based on all the evidence
presented. With few exceptions aside from the mandatory exclusion of
128 German Code of Criminal Procedure § 136.
129 Stephen C. Thaman, Comparaive Criminal Procedure 80 (Carolina 2002).
130 Decision of February 27, 1992, reprinted in 22 NJW 1463 (1992) (Germany); Bradley, 14 Mich J
Intl L at 215 (cited in note 95).
131 Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionag Rule in Germay, 96 Harv L Rev 1032, 1050 (1983).
132 German Code of Criminal Procedure 5 136a (cited in note 128); Thaman, Comparative Criminal
Procedure at 90 (cited in note 129).
133 See Bradley, 14 MichJ Intl L at 215 (cited in note 95).
134 Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function: The Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in
Adversarial and InquisitotialJusice Systems, 12 Intl Legal Persp 185, 225 (2002).
135 Hatchard, Comparative Criminal Procedure at 111 (cited in note 125).
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statements violating § 136a, "the German exclusionary decision [] is left to the
discretion of the trial judge."' 136
IV. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS OF TORTURE OR
COERCION IN OBTAINING STATEMENTS
International tribunals, established to enforce international rules of law and
to prosecute violations of established human rights, borrow from the laws and
practices of the nations they monitor. The ad hoc Tribunals developed out of
the need for fora in which to prosecute serious crimes committed during the
wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The ICC prosecutes the most serious
human rights violations and crimes against humanity. The ECtHR allows
individuals to bring complaints against state parties and offers a neutral stage on
which to litigate allegations implicating fundamental principles and national
issues. The treaties governing these international tribunals resemble and often
mirror the laws of member nations, laws that protect human rights fundamental
to individuals, regardless of nationality. Judges presiding over international
tribunals already look to national laws for guidance in making substantive
decisions, as the ICTY Chamber did in Prosecutor v Delai et al'37 The rules
governing the admissibility of testimonial evidence in national criminal cases can
likewise inform international judges' decisions about procedure and can help to
establish a more coherent general rule of evidence. This harmonization of
international and domestic procedural rules of evidence-especially in the
context of statements allegedly obtained through oppression or other inhuman
treatment-gives rise to both advantages and concerns.
A. Benefits of Judicial Assessment of the Admissibility of
Testimonial Evidence
There is a danger in an absolute exclusionary rule that omits reliable,
probative statements from criminal cases without first determining whether they
were in fact obtained through illegal coercion or torture. Failure to assess the
credibility of such allegations can create incentives for criminal suspects to
falsely claim that their confessions or statements were improperly obtained in
order to exclude the evidence from trial and therefore to decrease the likelihood
of conviction.
Unlike national courts, which developed concurrently with each respective
nation's legal structure, international tribunals were established long after
136 Kuk Cho, 'Procedural Weakness" of German Criminaljusice and Its Unique Exclusionary Rules Based on
the Right of Personaliy, 15 Temp Intl & Comp LJ 1, 8 (2001).
137 See Section II.B.4.
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concrete laws and imprecise fundamental rights were settled. These international
judicial institutions "have been shaped by political leaders and diplomats more
than by jurists with expertise in international and comparative criminal law and
procedure. Thus, several of these institutions reflect less than impartial and
effective justice.'' 38 As an examination of the international tribunals reveals, the
courts' rules of procedure and evidence suffer from ambiguities and gaps that
leave important issues unsettled. Specifically, the international tribunals do not
clarify the judge's role in evaluating testimonial evidence and in determining the
admissibility of challenged confessions or statements in serious international
criminal prosecutions.
Endowing international judges with the task of assessing the credibility of
allegations of impropriety before rewarding such claims with the exclusion of
the evidence will increase the fairness and integrity of the court proceedings
while imposing little additional burden on the judges. in national courts, judges
are the gatekeepers of evidence-US judges determine issues of credibility,
reliability and admissibility under FRE 104(a), while French and German judges
freely evaluate all the evidence before them with an eye to discovering the
material truth above all else. Similar to the judges on these national courts,
judges of the international tribunals are capable of evaluating the circumstances
of a particular case to determine whether the admission of contested evidence
will have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. An impartial judge
may exclude challenged statements if he finds that the statement was improperly
obtained. If he finds that the evidence was obtained through no violation of
fundamental laws, he shall admit the evidence and increase the reliability of the
proceedings. This procedure will ensure that valid, relevant testimonial evidence
is not arbitrarily excluded from trial. In addition, it will impose consistency
among the various international tribunals and will find support in some national
practices.
B. Problems with Judicial Assessment of the Admissibility of
Testimonial Evidence
Attempting to transpose the discretionary exclusionary rule of domestic
courts to international tribunals may also carry its own pitfalls, however. To
administer a discretionary model in international tribunals that operate at
different levels and with different jurisdictions would require a standardized
criminal procedure that the treaties do not currently support. Additionally, such
case-by-case evaluation and determination of the admissibility of contested
138 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law at 583 (cited in note 79).
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evidence may create instability and uncertainty that undermines the integrity of
the specialized international tribunals.
The adoption of a discretionary evaluative model could also create
confusion and variation in the burden of proof required to overcome a
defendant's allegation that his confession or statement was obtained in violation
of recognized human rights. In US suppression hearings, the prosecution bears
the burden of proving that the statements were voluntarily given by a
preponderance of the evidence. In France, the prosecution must present
evidence that persuades the judge's intime conviction, or inner belief. 139 The
elevated standard of proof in English criminal trials requires that the prosecution
provide evidence establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. The
burden likewise lies with the prosecution in cases in the ad hoc Tribunals, where
the Chamber finds that "the nature of the issue demands for admissibility the
most exacting standard consistent with the allegation. Thus, the Prosecution
claiming voluntariness on the part of the Accused/suspect, or absence of
oppressive conduct, is required to prove it convincingly and beyond reasonable
doubt." 4 To require such a high standard of proof in international cases to
overcome every allegation of inhuman treatment in the collection of statements
may create complications beyond the purview of the international tribunals and
may overly complicate the pretrial stage of the proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Challenges to the voluntariness of statements and confessions offered as
evidence often arise in criminal trials, and the judge shoulders the difficult task
of assessing the credibility of each party's position to determine whether the
evidence should be admitted. It is undisputed on both the national and
international level that coerced confessions or statements obtained through
oppression, inhuman conduct or torture should be excluded from trial. Courts
exclude evidence when these allegations are found to be valid in the interest of
deterring and penalizing improper interrogation practices and upholding
defendants' fundamental right to a fair trial. The international tribunals have no
lesser interest in promoting justice and in ensuring a fair trial, for both the
defendant and the prosecution.
International norms of due process have made their way into the laws and
constitutions of nations, and international tribunals have likewise borrowed the
established rules of procedure and evidence of national judicial systems.
International and domestic rules have merged in many ways, but the evidentiary
139 Hatchard, Comparative Criminal Procedure at 29 (cited in note 125).
140 Delai et a, Case No ICTY-96-21-T at 42 (cited in note 73).
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standards of admissibility for allegedly coerced statements have yet to be
reconciled. Establishing a uniform standard of discretionary judicial assessment
will enable the international tribunals to enforce their rulings in member states
and will create a harmony of outcomes. These are especially valuable
achievements in light of the increase in the mobility of criminals and
transnational cooperation in the prosecution of crimes.
Requiring judges to evaluate the veracity of challenges to the voluntariness
and hence admissibility of testimonial evidence will not threaten the uniformity
of international criminal justice. Instead, it will promote fair proceedings that
achieve the courts' shared purpose of determining the truth without threatening
defendants' human rights. Scholars who criticize the potential for the
discretionary exclusionary rule in international criminal proceedings focus on the
potential for inconsistency if courts decide evidentiary issues on a case-by-case
basis. However, these critics do not recognize the valuable role that judicial
discretion and judicial assessment of credibility can play when permitted at an
early stage of the process. Determining whether the collection of a testimonial
did in fact violate the defendant's human rights can prevent more complicated
procedural and substantive issues later in adjudicative proceedings. It will also
avoid the danger present in a system of automatic exclusion-that international
tribunals would improperly credit unfounded allegations of torture.
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